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SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN OHIO
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
guarantees the right of the people to be secure "against unreasonable
searches and seizures," and that "no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause," 1 and the language contained in article I of the Ohio
Constitution is substantially the same.' Formerly, evidence obtained
under an illegal search and seizure was admissible in the Ohio courts
if it was pertinent to the main issue in the case, and the courts did
not concern themselves with the collateral issue of how it was ob-
tained,3 while the federal courts followed the exclusionary rule which
made such evidence inadmissible.' However the United States Supreme
Court held in Mapp v. Ohio5 that the exclusionary rule was applicable
to the states regardless of the reliability of the evidence obtained.
There followed much speculation as to whether federal or state stan-
dards should be applied to determine the legality of the search and
seizure.' This question was decided in Ker v. California,7 where the
Supreme Court stated that the substantive standards of the fourth
amendment apply to the states. In so holding, the Court said that the
demands of federalism compel a distinction between that evidence
held inadmissible under the Supreme Court's supervisory power over
the federal courts and that which is held inadmissible under the fourth
amendment. The implication of the opinion was that there are certain
areas in which the standards of the federal courts need not be applied,
but the Court proceeded to apply the federal standard of reasonable-
ness anyway. Also a recent Supreme Court decision can be read as
saying that a state's procedural rules are unconstitutional if they pre-
1 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2 Ohio Const. art. I, § 14.
3 State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960); State v. Lindway, 131
Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 506 (1936) ; State v. Sabo, 103 Ohio St.
200, 140 N.E. 499 (1923); Rosanski v. State, 106 Ohio St. 442, 140 N.E. 370 (1922). For
a brief period following the decision in Nicholas v. Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 474, 182 N.E.
26 (1932) the Ohio courts followed the exclusionary rule.
4 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
5 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6 See Comment, "The Federal Standard of Search and Seizure," 13 Drake L. Rev. 65
(1963).
7 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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vent a vindication of the defendant's federal rights unless the rule
serves a legitimate state interest.8
The meaning of these cases is not entirely clear but it is obvious
that the Ohio courts will be required to decide future cases with refer-
ence to the federal standards. Thus, the federal cases involving the
standards of probable cause and reasonableness and the later Ohio
cases are of great importance to Ohio criminal lawyers. Primary em-
phasis here will be given to the later Ohio cases and how they have
been influenced by the federal standards.
First, some general problems of searches and arrests, probable
cause, reasonableness, and determining the fruits of an illegal search
will be investigated. Consideration will then turn to the more specific
problems involved in searches pursuant to warrants, searches without
warrants, searches incident to arrests, arrests pursuant to warrants,
and arrests without a warrant. Emphasis will be given to the Ohio
statutory procedures and how they should be changed in light of the
federal standards. Lastly, the procedure to attack a search as illegal
will be discussed.
II. PROBABLE CAUSE
Searches and seizures are not generally lawful under the Ohio or
federal constitutions unless made upon probable cause. Thus a search
warrant may not be issued until it is shown that there is probable
cause to believe that the item sought is present where the search is to
be conducted.' The fourth amendment applies to the area of arrest as
well as search. 10 Both Ohio and the federal courts allow an officer to
arrest with probable cause," and the Ohio statute allows an arrest to
be made without a warrant where there are reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed.'" The term "reasonable
grounds" is used interchangeably with "probable cause."' 3 The concept
of probable cause is also relevant where there is a search made inci-
dent to a valid arrest. A search is valid when incident to an arrest
which is made with probable cause.14
Hence, probable cause is the legal criterion for determining when
8 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
9 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Hudson v. State, 35 Ohio App. 87, 172
N.E. 301 (1929); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.22 (Page 1954).
10 See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
11 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Dixon v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St.
20, 201 N.E.2d 592 (1964).
12 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.04 (Page 1954).
13 State v. Rogers, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796 (C.P. 1963).
14 See United States v. Leflowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); State v. Beck, 175 Ohio St.
73, 191 N.E.2d 825 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
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a search may be made or a person arrested. It has been said that it
exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the
arresting officer, and of which he had reasonably trustworthy infor-
mation, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution to believe that an offense has been committed. 5 The evidence
used to establish probable cause need not be admissible in a jury
trial,1" and can be much less than would be necessary to convict the
defendant. 7 An analysis will be attempted here of the later cases in-
volving probable cause to determine the factors which are considered
in deciding the legality of searches and seizures as well as arrests.
A. Area
One factor that may be important in determining probable cause
is the geographic area in which the defendant is arrested or searched.
For example, the defendant might be found in surroundings which
would indicate his having committed the crime. In Carroll v. United
States," an automobile was stopped and searched without a warrant.
In upholding the search, the Court emphasized the fact that defendants
were suspected of transporting liquor and that they were driving in an
area which was known as an active center for bootlegging. 9 In the
Ohio case of State v. Young,2" the police had received information
that there was a "numbers ticket" violation at a certain address. After
watching the premises for a period of time, the officers secured a
search warrant (the validity of which was apparently not questioned)
which named "John Doe" as the person to be seized. Inside the house
the officers found defendant talking on the phone. In the room they
also discovered an adding machine, a shotgun, some paper and carbon
paper some of which bore indentations of numbers marked thereon.
They thereupon arrested and searched defendant and seized a record
of "clearing house" or "numbers ticket" bets. The court held the arrest
and search of defendant to be lawful, noting that one, while bearing
contraband articles such as those which were the object of the search,
cannot stand in the presence of an officer making a lawful search of the
15 Carroll v. United States, supra note 11.
16 See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); State v. Waldbilg, 1 Ohio
St. 2d 50, 203 N.E.2d 361 (1964).
17 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), followed in State v. Rogers, 27
Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796 (C.P. 1963).
18 Supra note 11.
19 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized the territory in other
cases. Brinegar v. United States, supra note 17; The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 361
(1824).




premises and be secure from arrest and subsequent seizure of those
items.'
This case, at first, seems factually similar to the United States
Supreme Court case of United States v. DiRe, 2 where an informer
pointed to an occupant of a car as the seller of counterfeit gasoline
coupons. The defendant was also in the car but the informant made
no reference to him. The Court held that even if the search of the car
was justified, the arrest of the defendant was made without probable
cause since his mere presence in the car proved nothing. The Supreme
Court rejected the argument, which prevailed in Young, that common
sense demands the occupants can be searched "where the contraband
sought is a small article which could easily be concealed on the
person. 3 Despite the holding in DiRe, the Ohio court in Young seems
correct. The basic reasoning of DiRe was that an arrest and search
could not be made incident to a search of an automobile or premises.
But the result in Young need not rest on this reasoning. The officers
had reason to believe that a numbers ticket violation was being carried
out on the premises. Items were found there which would further
corroborate this fact, and the defendant was discovered on the prem-
ises. Thus there was independent probable cause, as distinguished from
a mere arrest and search of the individual as incident to a search of
the premises.
B. Previous Criminal Activity
Another factor, sometimes mentioned by the courts as affecting a
finding of probable cause, is previous criminal activity. 4 In State v.
Smith, 25 police received information from informants concerning nar-
cotics activity in defendant's room. The court, in upholding the arrest
and search incident thereto, emphasized the fact that the officers had
seen a known addict in the window of the room. Although this factor
would not constitute probable cause of itself, the Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized it several times as tending to show
probable cause2
21 Id. at 24.
22 332 U.S. 581 (1947).
23 Id. at 586.
24 Comment, "Probable Cause: The Federal Standard," 25 Ohio St. L.J. 502, 507
(1964).
25 94 Ohio L. Abs. 271, 202 N.E.2d 215 (C.P. 1964).
26 Brinegar v. United States, supra note 17; Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694
(1931) ; Carroll v. United States, supra note 11.
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C. Suspicious Conduct
Many times an officer will observe the premises in an attempt to
discover suspicious activity which would tend to establish probable
cause. In some prohibition cases, the Ohio courts have emphasized the
fact that men entered into the premises sober, and some time there-
after returned in a state of intoxication 7 Also the fact that the de-
fendant was driving around in his automobile very late at night has
been a factor tending to create probable cause.28 However, such ob-
servations must be of greater force than to give the officers a mere
suspicion of illegal activities. In State v. Keeling,2 the arresting offi-
cers testified that they had a "weak suspicion" that a numbers game
was being conducted at a certain apartment but did not know who the
occupants were. The officers entered the stairway of the apartment
building by ringing the doorbell of an apartment other than the one
suspected of harboring the violators. At the door of the suite, they
overheard the operation of an adding machine. Without announcing
their presence, the officers kicked open the door and proceeded to
search, the result being the discovery of a clearing house operation
and the arrest of the six occupants of the premises. The court held that
there was no probable cause when the police acted merely upon a
weak suspicion and upon hearing an adding machine in the apartment.
In Dixon v. Maxwell, 0 the petitioner in a habeas corpus action in
the Ohio Supreme Court claimed he had been arrested without prob-
able cause and that the search incident thereto was hence unlawful.
The police had come to the vicinity of the building in which petitioner
was arrested in answer to a complaint that one of the apartments was
being used as a house of prostitution. From about 100 feet away they
observed petitioner remove a large quantity of clothing from the trunk
of an automobile. The police saw the petitioner and his companions
carry the clothing into the building where he was subsequently
arrested. The search which followed resulted in the seizure of the
clothing which was the basis of petitioner's conviction. The arrest was
held to have been lawful. This result, on the basis of the facts given in
the opinion, is probably incorrect by federal standards. If the case held
that there was probable cause to believe that someone was committing
the crime of prostitution in the apartment, such holding was on the
27 Babika v. Cleveland, 40 Ohio App. 45, 177 N.E. 914 (1931); Hudson v. State, 35
Ohio App. 87, 172 N.E. 301 (1929).
28 South Euclid v. Palliino, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 280, 193 N.E.2d 560 (Munic. Ct. South
Euclid 1963).
29 182 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
30 177 Ohio St. 20, 201 N.E.2d 592 (1964).
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basis of information given by an informant alone, which so far as the
opinion shows was uncorroborated. Such evidence cannot be the basis
of probable cause in the federal courts unless the informant is known
by the officers to be reliable.3 ' On the other hand, if the court held
that the officers had probable cause to believe that the clothing had
been stolen, the only evidence within the officers' knowledge was that
the petitioner carried twenty-nine suits into the apartment.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Henry v. United
States32 would seem to dictate a different result. In that case agents
had been given information "concerning the implication of the de-
fendant Pierotti with the interstate shipments" which had been stolen,
but the informer had not told the agents he actually suspected
Pierotti of the theft. The officers observed the petitioner and Pierotti
leave a tavern and get into their automobile. The agents followed the
car and saw it enter an alley and stop. The petitioner entered a gang-
way leading to residential premises and returned with some cartons. As
they drove off, the agents were unable to follow the car but later found
it parked near the same tavern. When the petitioner proceeded again
to the alley, the officers arrested him. In holding that there was no
probable cause the Court noted, "riding in a car, stopping in an alley,
picking up packages, driving .. ." were ali acts of the outwardly inno-
cent. As in the Dixon case, there were no facts within the knowledge
of the officers, except outwardly innocent actions, to support the arrest.
Therefore the Dixon case would probably have been decided differ-
ently upon a motion to suppress in a federal court.
Two additional Ohio lower court decisions deserve attention be-
cause of their apparently conflicting results. In South Euclid v.
Pallidino,33 police observed defendant and his companion driving in
an automobile. The police thought they recognized defendant as the
driver of the car. They also knew that defendant's name was included
on the police department's list of known criminals. After identifying
defendant's license number and "positively identifying" him, they
stopped his car. Defendant was unable to give an explanation of what
he was doing in the area at 2:50 A.M., other than to state that he and
his friend had "just wanted to ride around and talk." While talking to
defendant the officer observed a part of a leather glove sticking out
from under the front seat. When another officer arrived at the scene
he recognized defendant's companion as having a previous criminal
record. The police suggested that they were "suspicious persons" and
31 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
32 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
33 Supra note 28.
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should be taken in for investigation. The car was searched and two sets
of channel locks, screwdrivers, wirecutter, and another pair of gloves
were found. The defendants were later charged under a "suspicious
person" ordinance which made it a misdemeanor to have in possession
tools designed to be employed in the commission of a felony, misde-
meanor, or violation of any other ordinance, or to wander about in the
streets at late or unusual hours in the night without any lawful busi-
ness, while not being able to give a satisfactory account of himself.
Also any person who was known to be a companion and associate of
criminals or other dissolute persons was also in violation of the ordin-
anceY4 The court held that since the defendant was violating the
suspicious person ordinance at the time of arrest, such arrest was law-
ful under Ohio Revised Code section 2935.03, providing that an
officer shall arrest a person "found violating" any law of the state
which shall constitute a misdemeanor. Therefore, the search was held
to be incident to such arrest. The court continued that even if such
arrest was invalid, the search was valid since there was probable
cause to believe a crime had been committed, that crime being
burglary. In so holding the court misconceived the test for determining
probable cause for a search without an arrest. The test is not
that there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed,
but rather that there is probable cause to search, i.e., whether the
officers have a good reason to believe that contraband, weapons, fruits
of the crime, or instrumentalities of the crime were in the car.
State v. Rogers35 involved the legality of an arrest and search
incident thereto. The facts were substantially similar to Pallidino but
the court reached the opposite result concerning probable cause. The
defendant was observed at 2:20 A.M. in an automobile. The officer
noticed that the driver of the automobile was not familiar with the
area and had a license number from another county. There had been
a burglary a few nights before which aroused the suspicion of the
officers. Upon questioning the occupants, the officer learned that the
car had been loaned by the owner to a third person who in turn loaned
it to the driver. The defendant and the two occupants gave conflicting
34 South Euclid, Ohio, Ordinance No. 573.01 (1952). This ordinance is similar in
many ways to the vagrancy statutes. This type of statute can be seriously questioned
when used to justify an arrest without a warrant which would otherwise not be lawful.
Douglas, "Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion," 70 Yale L.J. 1, 12-13 (1960); Foote, "The
Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?" 51 J. Crim. L., C. &
P.S. 402, 407 (1960). However counsel for defendants did not argue the constitutionality
of the ordinance as here applied. Therefore in ruling on this motion the court assumed
it to be constitutional.
35 27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796 (C.P. 1963).
[Vol. 2 7
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stories as to the reason for their presence. Upon searching the auto-
mobile, the officers found a gun which one of the passengers said
belonged to the defendant. The court held that the officers were justi-
fied in being "strongly suspicious," but that there was not quite prob-
able cause to arrest.
It is possible to reconcile the different results reached in the two
cases discussed above. In Rogers, the fact that the occupants gave
conflicting stories as to the reason for their presence, coupled with the
lateness of the hour, was not enough to justify an arrest. But in
Pallidino, it is arguable that the additional factor that one of the
occupants of the automobile was known to have a prior criminal record
was enough to constitute probable cause. However, it is more likely
that the cases are simply at variance, thus indicating the difficulty
which the courts have had in applying the probable cause standard.
D. Hearsay
A much litigated question in recent years has been to what extent
information given to officers by informants can be considered in deter-
mining whether such officer had probable cause to arrest or search.
Although there are often disputes as to the sufficiency of corroboration
necessary, it has been held that hearsay may be considered as a factor
tending to establish probable cause, both in Ohio,36 and in the federal
courts.3 7 However if the officers make an arrest or search in response
to a complaint by a person not known by them to be reliable, and
under circumstances not tending to show the present reliability of the
informant, such arrest or search is illegal in the absence of some facts
within the knowledge of the officers which tend to corroborate the in-
formation given. The problem can be illustrated by the facts of State
v. Waldbillig." About 11:00 P.M. police were called about a break-in
at a laundromat. Upon their arrival, they found that several money
containers had been broken and some money had apparently been
taken. The police were advised that several individuals had been break-
ing into coin boxes, and they were given the descriptions of those indi-
viduals and of their get-away car and license number. Shortly there-
after, an automobile fitting the description was seen as it was being
backed out of defendant's driveway by defendant. The defendant was
36 See Akron v. Williams, 175 Ohio St. 186, 196 N.E.2d 63 (1963); Johnson v. Reddy,
163 Ohio St. 347, 126 N.E.2d 911 (1955) ; State v. Ball, 1 Ohio App. 2d 297; 204 N.E.2d
557, appeal dismissed, 176 Ohio St. 481, 200 N.E.2d 335 (1964); State v. Bartlett, 119 Ohio
App. 483, 200 N.E.2d 660 (1964); State v. Smith, 94 Ohio L. Abs. 271, 202 N.E.2d 215
(C.P. 1964).
37 Draper v. United States, supra note 16.
38 1 Ohio St. 2d 50, 203 N.E.2d 361 (1964).
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arrested and searched, and the car was searched. The court assumed
without discussion that the arrest was lawful. This case was clearly de-
cided correctly according to the federal standard of probable cause.
There was corroborative evidence within the knowledge of the officers
that the crime actually took place since they observed the broken money
containers. Furthermore, the officers had evidence of the present
reliability of their informers that the defendant had committed the
crime because the same information was given them by more than one
informant. The federal cases have been reluctant to declare an arrest or
search void if two informers give the same information, thus tending
to corroborate each other.39
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Draper v.
United States,4" probable cause may be established without any cor-
roboration of the crime itself. There an arrest was made on the
strength of a tip from an informer who had told police that the de-
fendant had gone to Chicago by train and would return to Denver with
three ounces of heroin. He also said that Draper would arrive in
Denver on either the eighth or ninth of September and gave a com-
plete description of him. Moreover he said that Draper would be carry-
ing a tan zipper bag and usually walked quite fast. The police went to
the station on the morning of the arrest and all the information as to
appearance and time of arrival was verified. The Court held the arrest
to be lawful. The informant had a record of past reliability as to infor-
mation given to the police. Furthermore his present reliability was
verified because the detailed description of the activities of the de-
fendant was observed to be correct before the arrest was made. Simi-
larly, an Ohio case has held that probable cause was established to
arrest for illegal possession of narcotics where the officers received
information from more than one informer, proven reliable in the past,
to the effect that narcotics activity was taking place in defendant's
room. 1 The only corroboration other than hearsay was that the offi-
cers observed a known addict in defendant's room.
The recent Ohio Supreme Court case of State v. Beck 42 deserves
attention because the facts as characterized by the court were similar
to Draper. The defendant was arrested for possession of clearing house
slips in violation of a state statute. The police knew that the defendant
had been previously convicted of the same offense. Information was
39 McDermott v. John Baumgarth Co., 286 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1961); United States
v. Rundle, 216 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Pa. 1963); United States v. Murphy, 174 F. Supp. 823
(D.D.C. 1959).
40 Supra note 16.
41 State v. Smith, supra note 36.
42 175 Ohio St. 73, 191 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
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given to the police by an informer that defendant would be in a
certain locality at a certain time pursuing his unlawful activities. When
he was found in that locality, as predicted, driving an automobile, he
was stopped and searched. At the police station the clearing house slips
were at last discovered in defendant's clothing. Defendant's motion
to suppress this evidence was overruled. He was found guilty, and the
Ohio State Supreme Court affirmed.43
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction44 but it
is not clear whether it did so on the law or the facts. The Court, noting
that the trial court made no finding of fact concerning probable cause,
found on the basis of the record that the officers did not have informa-
tion as to the defendant's specific location. Thus the arrest was merely
on the basis of hearsay uncorroborated by any past or present reli-
ability of the informant.
However, assuming the facts to be as characterized by the Ohio
court, its finding of probable cause may have been correct. In Draper
there was no corroboration of the crime itself, while here the officer
knew that the defendant had previously been convicted of the
same offense. Unlike Draper, the officers in Beck had no evidence of
the past reliability of the informants, but some lower federal courts
have held that it is unnecessary to present evidence of past reliability
or corroboration of the crime itself, if evidence corroborative of
present reliability is presented.45 It should be noted, however, that the
facts as stated in the opinion show only that information had been
given to police by the informer that defendant would be "in a certain
locality at a certain time,"4" while the information given in Draper was
much more detailed.
Although the information of a single informant is generally not
sufficient, unless corroborated or unless evidence of present reliability
is presented, some exceptions are given by the cases. Some lower
federal courts have held that if the information comes from a paid
informer or one employed for the purpose of uncovering such infor-
mation, and such informer has a record of past reliability, such infor-
mation is sufficient to constitute probable cause.47 Also where an
43 Two judges dissented on the theory that the offense was a misdemeanor rather
than a felony as characterized by the majority. Thus the arrest was not valid under the
Revised Code unless the defendant was "found violating a law." Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2935.03 (Page 1953).
44 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
45 Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962); McDermott v. John
Baumgarth, supra note 39.
46 State v. Beck, supra note 42, at 74, 191 N.E.2d at 827.
47 Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Butler v. United States,
273 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1959).
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officer receives information through some mode of communication from
another officer, he may rely on it for an arrest or search of the person
implicated. 8 Many times the cases fail to discuss whether or not the
informing officer had probable cause; however, at least one federal
court has correctly held that an FBI agent, upon receiving telephone
information from another agent, can acquire no greater authority than
could have been exercised by the co-agent if he had been in the arrest-
ing agent's position. 9 The courts should continue to allow police to
rely on statements made by fellow officers since the statements of
policemen would appear to have a sufficient likelihood of being correct.
The concept of inherent reliability of information of certain in-
formants could conceivably have application in other situations. In
Wong Sun v. United States, 0 the informer was under arrest when he
told of his purchase of heroin from one of the defendants. Mr. Justice
Clark, arguing for the dissent, said that the officers had good reason to
rely on the information given since the informant implicated himself
as well as defendant by such information. Thus the statement was a
declaration against interest, worthy of belief.51
Furthermore, in a recent case involving the sufficiency of a com-
plaint in a tax evasion case, the Supreme Court suggested that unlike
the narcotics informant in the arrest cases, whose credibility may often
be suspect, the sources in the instant case were less likely to produce
false or untrustworthy information.52 Therefore the Court may be
moving toward the position of permitting officers to rely on certain in-
formants without corroboration where the situation indicates a par-
ticular reliability of such informants.
III. REASONABLENESS
A. Standards of Reasonableness
In addition to the probable cause requirement, both the fourth
amendment and the Ohio constitution assure to the people the right to
be free against unreasonable searches and seizures. The factors which
have been considered as relevant to the reasonableness of a search are
many. It has been said that "these factors include the scope of the
search in area covered and in terms of the nature and number of
48 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Johnson v. Reddy, supra note
36; State v. Ball, supra note 36.
49 United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951).
50 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
51 Id. at 500.
52 Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965).
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items to be seized, the time the search occurs, the place to be searched,
whether the arrest is merely a pretext for search, immediate necessity
to search, and consent of the accused.'1' 3
A search does not include the reasonable observations of an officer.
Thus if an officer is lawfully on the premises, he is not required to
shut his eyes to incriminating evidence which is in plain sight. An
example is presented in State v. Waldbillig,"4 where police arrested
the defendant and took his automobile to the police station. While
driving the automobile, the officer hit a steel object with his foot
which later turned out to be a revolver. The revolver was admissible
as evidence at the trial even though the search of the car at the
police station was too remote in time to the arrest to have been
sustained as incident thereto.
Generally, a search which covers too large an area and in which
no particular object is sought will be unreasonable." The number of
items seized probably has a bearing on the question of whether the
search is merely exploratory with no definite object being sought.
Therefore in Kreman v. United States,56 the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed a conviction which was based on many items of
evidence obtained in a general ransack of an entire cabin.
Furthermore, according to federal law, only certain items may be
the object of a search. Boyd v. United States" is the leading case on
this subject. The Supreme Court in that case drew a distinction be-
tween a search for stolen goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed
to avoid payment thereof, and a search for and seizure of a man's
private papers for the purpose of obtaining information to be used
against him. The Court said, "In one case the government is entitled to
the possession of the property; in the other it is not.""8 The Supreme
Court has since said that items properly seizable are limited to the
following: the instrumentalities and means by which the crime is
committed, the fruits of the crime, weapons by which escape of the
person arrested might be affected, and contraband.59 "Mere evidence"
may not be seized unless it falls into one of the defined categories. The
items which fall within these classes may, if found during an otherwise
53 Comment, 25 Ohio St. LJ. 538, 553 (1964).
54 Supra note 38.
G5 See Bock v. Cincinnati, 43 Ohio App. 257, 183 N.E. 119, appeal dismissed, 124
Ohio St. 667, 181 N.E. 888 (1931).
G6 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
57 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
58 Id. at 623.
G9 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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reasonable search, be used as evidence in a prosecution even if they
are unrelated to the original purpose of the search.60
The Ohio statute dealing with search warrants states several items
for which a warrant may issue.61 The enumerated items are said not to
affect or modify other laws for search and seizure. Because all of the
items listed would be properly seizable in the federal courts, it can be
argued that the statute contemplates that the mere evidence rule be
followed, and an early Ohio case appears to assume in dicta that such
is the rule.62 But even assuming that the rule applies to searches made
pursuant to a warrant, the question could still be undecided as to a
warrantless search, and no Ohio case has been found which specifically
decides this question.
It is also unclear as to whether the mere evidence rule is a consti-
tutional requirement which is binding on the states. Recently two dif-
ferent states have held the rule to be inapplicable to the states,63 while
another has limited it to apply only to private papers and books, and
60 Ibid.
61 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.21 (Page 1953):
A judge of the court or a magistrate may, within his jurisdiction, issue warrants
to search a house or place:
(A) For property stolen, taken by robbers, embezzled, or obtained under
false pretense;
(B) For weapons, implements, tools, instruments, articles or property used
as a means of the commission of a crime, or when any of such objects or articles
are in the possession of another person with the intent to use them as a means
of committing crime;
(C) For forged or counterfeit coins, stamps, imprints, labels, trade-marks,
bank bills, or other instruments of writing, and dies, plates, stamps, or brands
for making them;
(D) For books, pamphlets, ballads, or printed papers containing obscene
language, prints, pictures, or descriptions manifestly tending to corrupt the
morals of youth, and for obscene, lewd, indecent or lascivious drawings, litho-
graphs, engravings, pictures, daguerreotypes, film or plate negatives, film or
plate positives, films designed to be projected on a screen for exhibition, films or
glass slides either in negatives or positive form designed for exhibition by projec-
tion on the screen, stereoscopic pictures, models, or casts, and for instruments or
articles of indecent or immoral use, or instruments, articles, or medicines for
procuring abortions, the preventing of conception, or self-pollution;
(E) For gaming table, establishment, device, or apparatus kept or exhibited
for unlawful gaming, or to win or gain money or other property, and for money
or property won by unlawful gaming.
The enumeration of certain property and materials in this section shall not
affect or modify other laws for search and seizure.
62 Rosanski v. State, 106 Ohio St. 442, 140 N.E. 370 (1922).
63 People v. Thayer, - Ca.2d -, 408 P.2d 108, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1965); People v.
Carroll, 38 Misc. 2d 630, 238 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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not to tangible objects such as a pair of shoes. 4 Thus tangible objects
could be seized even though they did not fit into the recognized types
of seizable items.0 5 In People v. Thayer,66 Chief Justice Traynor, of
the California Supreme Court, stated that although the United States
Supreme Court in Gouled v. United States67 purported to rest its hold-
ing in favor of the rule on the fourth and fifth amendments, it did not
rely on specific constitutional language. Furthermore, the Court could
not have known the later significance of basing its decision on the Con-
stitution rather than its supervisory power over the lower federal
courts. It was also noted that the rule has been condemned as unsound
by most modem writers.6" It is also extremely arbitrary in that after
the search has been made, some items are allowed to be used as
evidence at trial while others are rejected as "merely evidence." The
restriction does not protect the privacy of the individual by preventing
unreasonable searches, but rather prevents the use of certain reliable
evidence obtained in an otherwise reasonable search.
Another factor which may affect the reasonableness of a search.
is the time of day that such search is made. Congress has recognized
that searches pursuant to warrants at night should require a greater
standard of probable cause than searches conducted during the
daytime."0 In Ohio, it is provided that the "command of the war-
rant shall be that the search be made in the daytime, unless there
is urgent necessity for a search in the night in which case a search
in the night may be ordered."7 0 The cases construing this provision
have generally been procedural,71 hence, not dealing with the facts
64 State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965).
05 It is true that most of the federal cases have involved searches of private books,
records, and papers. But some federal courts have applied the rule to tangible physical
objects. An example is Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958), where
a bloody handkerchief was held to be mere evidence.
G6 Supra note 63.
67 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
08 Kaplan, "Search and Seizure: A No Man's Land in the Criminal Law," 49 Calif.
L. Rev. 474 (1961) ; Traynor, "Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States," 1962 Duke
L.J. 319, 330-31; Comment, 25 Ohio St. L.J. 538, 557 (1964).
00 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) provides in part:
The warrant shall direct that it be served in the daytime, but if the affidavits
are positive that the property is on the person or place to be searched, they may
direct that it be served anytime.
70 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.24 (Page 1953).
71 State v. Sabo, 105 Ohio St. 200, 140 N.E. 499 (1923), held that a search actually
made in the daytime was not made unlawful by the failure to cross out the words "in
the daytime" or "in the nighttime," from the warrant; Kovacs v. State, 24 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 1 (C.P. 1921) held that a search must be made in the daytime unless otherwise
specified.
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necessary to show a need for a night search. However, an early case
said that it must be shown that it would be impossible to serve the
warrant in the daytime before a night search warrant could be issued.7"
Whatever the standard, it is clear that at least with respect to
searches pursuant to warrants, something more must be shown to
justify a search made at night than one made during the day. Whether
this reasoning is constitutional doctrine and therefore applicable to
warrantless searches is not clear. In a recent Supreme Court case7'
involving a search incident to an arrest made at night, the Court did
not discuss time as a factor in upholding the search, and similar cases
may be found in Ohio. 4 However, it is obvious that a night search
involves a greater invasion of privacy, thus indicating that time should
be a factor in determining the reasonableness of a search regardless of
whether or not the search is made pursuant to a warrant.
Also, the place of the search is a factor which tends to establish
its reasonableness. The Constitution of Ohio preserves to the people
the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions
against unreasonable searches and seizure," and the fourth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States is similarly worded. Searches
of the defendant's automobile,75 garage in the rear of his home, 6 club
of which he is a member,7 7 office, 78 and apartment or hotel9 have all
been held to be within the privilege. Some federal courts have held that
buildings outside the curtilage are not within the constitutional pro-
tection, 0 nor is a large pasture area,' even if owned by the defendant.
These cases are difficult to justify on the language of the constitutional
provisions creating the right to be free from search and seizure. The
fourth amendment says that the right shall enable the people to be
secure in their "persons, houses, papers, and effects," while the Ohio
Constitution uses the word "possessions." A literal reading of these
provisions indicates that all possessions of the individual should be
72 Columbus v. Buehler, 23 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 589 (Munic. Ct. Columbus 1921).
73 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
74 DLxon v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 20, 201 N.E.2d 592 (1964); State v. Smith, 29
Ohio Op. 2d 437, 202 N.E.2d 215 (C.P. 1964).
75 State v. Rogers, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796 (C.P. 1963).
76 Antoszewski v. State, 5 Ohio Op. 264, 31 N.E.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1936).
77 State v. Cooper, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 361, 196 NXE.2d 160 (Munic. Ct. Bellefontaine
1963).
78 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 96 (1950).
79 Saulsbury v. Green, 175 Ohio St. 433, 195 N.E.2d 787, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 912
(1964); State v. Keeling, 182 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
80 Brock v. United States, 256 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Hodges v. United States, 243
F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957).
81 Hodges v. United States, supra note 80.
[Vol. 2 7
COMMENT
within the privilege even though certain items are of a more private
nature. If this reading were adopted, searches of the more private
possessions could be subject to greater safeguards. This view is sup-
ported by the cases, discussed later in detail, holding that a warrant-
less search may be made of an automobile upon probable cause,8s while
such a search generally may not be made of a private dwelling8
B. Consent
A search made with the consent of the defendant is not unreason-
able, because the privilege is for his own protection. But if a consent
is given for reasons which are unacceptable to the courts, such as
coercion, such consent is not effective and the evidence obtained is
inadmissible. The difficult problem is to determine the meaning of
coercion. Obviously it does not mean that the consenter must desire
the officer to make the search upon his premises, as few people would
ever be deemed to have effectively consented. On the other hand, the
consent should be freely and intelligently given since the courts may
indulge in reasonable presumptions against waiver of constitutional
rights. 4 The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a consent is not effec-
tive under circumstances indicating it was given in submission to
authority." However, where the defendant confesses and then allows
the police to search," or assists them in such search, the consent is
said to be effective.8 7 In State v. Lett"8 officers went to defendant's
apartment on information that he had been having parties and pos-
sessed a number of obscene pictures. The door to the apartment was
open and the defendant was seated in the kitchen. After being ad-
mitted, the officers disclosed the nature of their business, to which the
defendant replied, "Well, there's nothing here. You can feel free to
look around; help yourself." During the search, the police requested
82 South Euclid v. Pallidino, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 280, 193 N.E.2d 560 (Munic. Ct. South
Euclid 1963).
83 State v. Vin, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 185 N.E.2d 506 (C.P. 1962).
84 Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 423 (10th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Page,
302 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1963); State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490, cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 506 (1936). See also Nagle v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 539 (Ct. App.
1930), rev'd on other grounds, 124 Ohio St. 59, 176 N.E. 886 (1931), where it was held
that the mere lack of objection to a search by police was not an effective consent.
85 State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 506
(1936).
88 Gilmore v. State, 15 Ohio App. 432 (1921).
87 United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962) (dictum), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 906 (1963); United States v. MacLeod, 207 F.2d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 1953) (dictum);
Carmosino v. State, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 688 (Ct. App. 1928).
8s 114 Ohio App. 414, 178 N.E.2d 96 (1961).
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the defendant to unlock a closet, which he did, and a small bank night
deposit pouch was found. As the officers began to inspect the pouch,
which contained obscene photographs, the defendant said, "do you
have a search warrant?" On these facts the court determined that the
defendant voluntarily and expressly invited and agreed to a search.
The very short opinion should not be read to say that a consent once
given cannot be revoked, since this finds no support in the law. Rather
the court said that the question asked by the defendant regarding a
search warrant did not constitute such a revocation but was merely a
recognition of his right to be free from search. Arguably the defendant
consented under at least some degree of coercion since the officers were
uniformed and did not inform the defendant of his right not to consent
to the search. However, this is a matter of degree. Too restricted a view
of consent would have the undesirable result of making all consents
ineffective and should therefore be avoided.
Two cases decided recently in the Ohio Supreme Court indicate
an inconsistency as to the quantum of coercion necessary to make a
consent ineffective. In O'Bannon v. Haskins,8 9 petitioner was convicted
for concealing stolen property. Police had previously asked petitioner
whether he had purchased some tires. When he indicated that he had,
they told him to remove them from his car and put them away. This he
did, storing them in his basement. On the occasion of the search, the
police came to petitioner's home and asked him where the tires were,
to which he replied that they were in the basement. The police pro-
ceeded to the basement and seized the tires. The court held that the
seizure was made with the consent of the petitioner. From the facts as
reported, it is difficult to justify this result. It would seem that in view
of the officers' prior contact with the petitioner, he was left with no real
alternative but to allow the search. In contrast, the United States
Supreme Court has held that when officers identified themselves prior
to entry and said, "I want to talk to you a little bit," entry was
granted in submission to authority rather than pursuant to an under-
standing and intentional waiver of a constitutional right. 0
In defense of the Ohio Court, it should be noted that O'Bannon
was a habeas corpus case. The court has been reluctant to grant habeas
corpus in search and seizure cases91 or other cases involving errors
which do not pertain to the jurisdiction of the court.92 This fact helps
89 1 Ohio St. 2d 110, 205 NYE.2d 16 (1965).
90 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
91 See Poe v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 28, 201 NXE.2d 703 (1964); Dixon v. Maxwell,
177 Ohio St. 20, 201 N.E.2d 592 (1964).
92 Note, 26 Ohio St. L.J. 496 (1965).
[VoI. 2 7
COMMENT
to explain the apparently conflicting result reached in Lakewood v.
Smith." There the officers knocked upon the door of defendant's home,
and when he answered, they stated their desire to enter and ask some
questions. After entering, the officers observed a "consensus sheet,"
a scratch pad, lead pencils and a daily racing form. Shortly thereafter,
the telephone rang and one of the officers answered. The person calling
tried to make a bet on a horse with the officer. The officer then dared
defendant to empty his pockets. He did empty one but refused to
empty the other. At that point the defendant was placed under arrest(Con suspicion that the evidence is in that pocket," and the police
forcibly examined the other pocket, finding betting slips. The court
held the entrance into the apartment to be illegal since it was acqui-
esced in only in submission to the authority of the police officers, rather
than a conscious waiver. Thus, the answering of the phone was a
trespass and an invasion of defendant's privacy. Furthermore, it was
held that without the information obtained from the telephone call, the
arrest and search incidental thereto were made without probable cause.
Finally it was held that even though the defendant emptied one pocket,
the officer was not justified in forcibly searching the other. In so doing
the court followed a federal case which held that a consent to a search
of a portion of one's premises is not a consent to search the whole
premises.8 4
Especially troubling are the problems involved in effective consent
to entry, as indicated by the facts of Lakewood. Questions arise as to
the identity of the person seeking entry. For example, the defendant
may invite an officer to enter without being aware of his identity. In
Illinois it has been held that the police must disclose their identity and
the nature of the visit before entry.9 5 However, in a related but not
identical situation, the Supreme Court of the United States in Ker v.
California90 held an arrest which is otherwise lawful is not made
unlawful by the officer's failure to give notice. Furthermore, in On Lee
v. United States97 an old acquaintance of defendant, who was a police
officer, entered the suspect's place of business, without revealing his
occupation, and recorded the ensuing conversation with a microphone
concealed on his person. The evidence thereby obtained was held to be
admissible. The Court distinguished the cases which had held that
there was no consent where entry was effected by affirmatively fraudu-
93 1 Ohio St. 2d 128, 205 N.E.2d 16 (1965).
94 Strong v. United States, 46 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1931).
95 People v. Dent, 371 Ill. 33, 19 N.E.2d 1020 (1939).
90 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
9 ' 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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lent action." Thus, the implication is that where no affirmative deceit
exists, the evidence is admissible, as where the defendant invites the
officers in without knowing their identity.
A further problem suggested by the facts of some cases is whether
the consent must be made with knowledge of the right to refuse per-
mission to search. It has been suggested that police officers seeking
consents to search should be required to inform the suspects of such
rights,9 but no Ohio or federal cases have been found which make such
a requirement.
The question sometimes arises as to who may consent to a search.
The leading federal case on this point is Stoner v. California.°° A hotel
clerk allowed the police to search a guest's room, in which were found
articles like those associated with a recent crime. It was held that the
clerk could not consent to the search even though he may have had "ap-
parent authority" according to agency principles. Consent was said to
depend on the actual authority of the night clerk. Recently Stoner was
followed by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Bernius,101 where the
person to whom defendant loaned his car consented to a search of the
car. Such consent was held to be ineffective, despite an earlier contrary
ruling by the fourth circuit,102 because there was no express consent of
the owner. Although the case involved a bailee giving his consent
rather than a hotel clerk, as in Stoner, the court felt that agency con-
cepts, i.e., apparent authority, could not be used to find consent.
Despite the absolute language found in Stoner, the lower federal
courts hold that where third persons have a sufficient level of control
over the premises to be searched, they can make an effective consent. A
wife has been held to be able to make an effective consent,10 3 as has
a co-tenant,' a partner,10 5 or the parent of an adult child living in
the father's house.' In Chapman v. United States'0 a landlord's con-
98 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921). In Gatewood v. United States, 209 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1953), an entry was
held unlawful where the officer stated: "From Western Union."
9 Comment, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 260, 268 (1964).
100 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
101 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964).
102 United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962). In .Eldridge the court
termed the consenter a bailee who had sufficient interest in the goods to consent.
103 Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 US. 844 (1948);
United States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937).
104 United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (NJ). Ill. 1961).
105 United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Skally v. United
States, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
106 State v. Kinderman, - Minn. -, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965).
107 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
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sent was not effective to permit a search of the tenant's premises, be-
cause under state law the landlord could not have entered to search
for distilling equipment. However, in the recent case of Burge v.
United States'"8 it was held that when defendant was a guest in a
rented apartment, the lessee could effectively consent to a search of
defendant's room. 9 While at first these cases may seem inconsistent,
the consenter in Burge had the right to be in the apartment since it
was leased in her name. The amount of control which she could exer-
cise over the premises was more substantial than the landlord in
Chapman.
Burge illustrates another problem involved where a third party
consents. The consent was given while the consenter was herself in jail.
This fact indicates that the consent may have been given under
coercion.110 Although the court did not discuss this point, the better
view would be that the consent given by the third party must also be
free of coercion."'
The case has one further significance in that it was decided after
the Supreme Court's decision in Stoner, thus indicating that Stoner
should be read to reject the theory of apparent authority to consent,
but not as rejecting all cases involving third party consent."' There-
fore the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Bernius, discussed above,
could be incorrect. Instead of holding the consent to be ineffective
because there can be no apparent authority to consent, citing Stoner,
the court should have determined whether or not a bailee of an auto-
mobile has sufficient control over the property to consent to a search.
The facts in Bernius are quite dissimilar to the facts in Stoner, where
a hotel clerk gave permission to search defendant's room, there being
no question that the clerk lacked the requisite control over the room.
IV. FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH
The exclusionary rule requires that no evidence be admitted which
was obtained because of an unlawful search and seizure. This pro-
hibition relates not only to evidence secured during the search, but also
to evidence discovered which is the "fruit of an illegal search." One
example of the tainting of evidence because of a prior illegal search is
the situation where the information obtained in the search is later used
108 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1965).
109 A similar ruling was made in Woodard v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 930 (1958).
110 Channel v. United States, 235 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
111 Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964).
112 This reading has been given to Stoner by other writers. See Note, 12 U.CA.L.
Rev. 614 (1965); Comment, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 260, 272 (1965).
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to supply probable cause for an arrest or search. This use of the in-
formation has been declared illegal." 3 In Lakewood v. Smith,114 officers
entered defendant's residence without probable cause or the consent of
the defendant. Since the entry was illegal, a telephone call which the
police took while in the residence was inadmissible, and moreover the
information gained was not considered by the court as contributing to
probable cause for a subsequent arrest of defendant.
Not all evidence obtained through illegal searches becomes
"sacred and inaccessible.""' Generally, some sort of cause require-
ment is imposed on its admissibiilty. Thus, in Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States,"6 the Supreme Court of the United States stated
that it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the evidence had
a source independent of the unlawful act. Therefore, the evidence is
admissible if the knowledge of it would have been gained regardless
of the unlawful search. It has been said that if the illegal act is the
indispensable or sole cause of the discovery of the evidence, the exclu-
sionary rule applies."' In State v. Rogers,"8 officers arrested de-
fendant and searched his automobile without probable cause. A pas-
senger in the car was questioned and said that the gun was in the
possession of the defendant. The motion to suppress sought to render
the testimony of the passenger at the trial inadmissible. The court
granted the motion seemingly on a "but for" test. Presumably, if the
prosecution could have learned of the witness through some other
means, independent of the search, such testimony would have been
admissible even though such passenger was present during the search.
The fourth amendment principle of exclusion has also had an
impact on the admissibility of confessions. The leading federal case
is Wong Sun v. United States,"9 where federal agents broke into the
house of petitioner without probable cause. While in his bedroom,
petitioner was interrogated, and thereafter he led the agents to nar-
cotics. Several days later he was again interrogated and made incrim-
inating statements. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction be-
cause of the admission of the narcotics, and of the statements made in
the bedroom. There has been some disagreement as to the impact of
113 McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1955).
114 Supra note 93.
115 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
116 Ibid.
117 Maguire, "How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amendment and the Exclu-
sionary Rule," 55 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 307, 313 (1964). See Monroe v. United States,
234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 893 (1956); Warren v. Hawaii, 119 F.2d
936 (9th Cir. 1941).
118 27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796 (C.P. 1963).
119 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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Wong Sun-20 One view is that the test of inadmissibility depends on
the confession's being "involuntary." Thus even if the confession is
made after an illegal arrest or search, it is admissible if there was no
coercion.121 Other courts have held confessions to be inadmissible
merely because they followed an illegal search.122 This seems to be
an unsatisfactory solution, since it is not difficult to conceive of a
situation where the defendant would have confessed regardless of the
unlawful search or arrest. The better view would make the causal con-
nection between the illegal act and the confession the crucial factor.
If the confession relates directly to the possession of goods found
during an illegal search, or to the offense for which the suspect was
illegally arrested, there would be little problem in determining that the
illegal act caused the confession. But where the two are unrelated, and
the confession is otherwise voluntary, the confession should be ad-
missible.
The Wong Sun doctrine is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. 3 There are, however, no Ohio cases dealing
with precisely the same problem. 24 In State v. Davis,125 a search was
made of defendant's home without a warrant, and stolen property was
found. When shown the property, defendant admitted the robbery and
made a written confession. Apparently no objection was made to the
use of the confession as the fruits of an illegal search. The Ohio
Supreme Court held the confession admissible because there was no
evidence to support the conclusion that it was not a voluntary state-
ment. However, if the question had been properly raised, the court may
have held the confession inadmissible since it probably would not have
been obtained absent the illegal search. 26
V. PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN SPECIFIC CLASSES OF CASES
A. Searches Pursuant to Warrant
In Ohio, searches pursuant to a warrant are governed by the
criminal code. Section 2933.21 deals generally with the property for
120 Wong Sun and the cases construing it are discussed in Herman, "The Supreme
Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation," 25 Ohio St. L.J. 449, 460 (1964).
121 See Hollingsworth v. United States, 321 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1963).
122 United States v. Marrese, 336 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1964); Gatlin v. United States,
326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
123 Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493 (1963) ; Herman, supra note 120, at 459.
124 In Akron v. Williams, 175 Ohio St. 186, 192 NYE.2d 63 (1963), the Ohio Supreme
Court held that a confession did not make a prior search lawful, but did not discuss the
admissibility of the confession itself.
125 1 Ohio St. 2d 28, 203 N.E.2d 357 (1964).
126 Although the court held the search to be illegal, the property was admitted into
evidence because a motion to suppress such evidence was not made prior to the trial.
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which a search warrant may be issued. 27 Searches may be made of a
"house or place." Presumably the term "place" contemplates all loca-
tions other than a home. Also the code provides that a search warrant
shall issue only upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the property and
things to be seized. 2'
Former Ohio law held that the affiant determined whether or not
there was probable cause for the search. The warrant would issue upon
his filing an affidavit stating that he "believed and had good cause to
believe" there was a concealment of property in connection with a
crime.2 9 Since the warrant issued as a matter of right, its issuance was
merely a ministerial transaction which the clerk of court could per-
form.9 0 Presently however, the statute provides that only a judge or
magistrate may issue the warrant, and it is clear that he must be satis-
fied that probable cause exists for the search. 3' The discretion rests
with the judge and not the officer, and the judge may demand further
evidence before issuing the warrant.
The procedural requirements concerning the affidavit for a search
warrant, and the contents and form of the warrant itself, are spelled
out specifically in the statute. A warrant shall not issue unless there is
filed with the judge or magistrate an affidavit, which "describe[s] the
house or place to be searched, the person to be seized, the things to be
searched for and seized, and [alleges] ... substantially the offense in
relation thereto.... ,na3 Not only must the affiant allege that he believes
and has good cause to believe that the items for which the search is to
be made are concealed therein, but he must also state the facts upon
which such belief is based. 88 In Aguilar v. Texas,8 4 the Supreme
Court of the United States raised this principle to the level of con-
stitutional doctrine. The affidavit in that case gave as its fact basis,
127 The forms of property enumerated within this section include all forms of:
(a) stolen property, (b) weapons, and tools used to commit crimes, (c) forged or counter-
feited documents and instruments, (d) obscene and immoral articles, and (e) gambling
operations. This statute is similar to the federal statute, Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b). Also
there is little doubt that these items may be searched for and seized under federal law,
assuming such search to be reasonable and made upon probable cause.
128 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.22 (Page 1953).
129 Rosanski v. State, 106 Ohio St. 442, 140 N.E. 370 (1922).
130 Id. at 451, 140 N.E. at 372.
231 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.23 (Page Supp. 1965).
132 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.23 (Page Supp. 1965).
133 Akron v. Williams, 175 Ohio St. 186, 192 N.E. 63 (1963); State v. Bartlett, 119
Ohio App. 483, 200 N..2d 660 (1964); State v. Watson, 117 Ohio App. 333, 192 N.E.2d
253 (1962).
"34 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
[Vol. 27
COMMENT
"affants have received reliable information from a credible person
and do believe that heroin, marijuana... are being kept at the above
described premises .... "I" Such statement was held to be merely a
conclusion rather than facts upon which the judge could base a deci-
sion about probable cause.
A further refinement of this doctrine was made in United States v.
Ventresca,"I where the affidavit was submitted to a United States
Commissioner by an investigator for the Internal Revenue Service,
stating that he had good reason to believe that an illegal distillery was
in operation in Ventresca's house. The grounds for his belief were set
forth in the affidavit, prefaced by the following statement:
Based upon observations made by me, and based upon informa-
tion received officially from other Investigators attached to the
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division assigned to this investigation,
and reports orally made to me describing the results of their obser-
vations and investigation, this request for the issuance of a search
warrant is made. 37
The basis of the objection was that the affidavit did not state that the
officers had personal knowledge of the facts which were set out in
detail therein. The court of appeals, though recognizing that an
officer may rely on statements made by fellow officers to establish
probable cause, held that nothing in the affidavit showed that the
investigators from whom the afflant received his information had
first hand knowledge of the facts stated, and therefore the affidavit was
insufficient. 3 s The Supreme Court reversed, holding that by reading
the affidavit in a common-sense manner, rather than technical, it was
obvious that insofar as the facts stated were not within the personal
knowledge of the affiant, they were based on the observations of the
fellow investigators. Thus, although the facts must be stated in detail
in the affidavit, the courts will not give it an unduly technical and
restrictive meaning.
The question of whether the affidavit must disclose the names of
informers will be discussed later. Suffice it to say here that the state
may find it necessary to make the disclosure in order to convince the
judge or magistrate that his information has been properly corrobo-
rated.139
The search warrant must contain all the material facts alleged in
the affidavit, and must describe the things to be searched for, the
135 Id. at 109.
136 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
137 Id. at 113.
138 Ventresca v. United States, 324 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1963).
139 State v. Bartlett, supra note 133.
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house or place to be searched, and the person to be searched and
seized.14° It has been said that the house to be searched need only be
described sufficiently for the officers to locate it on the basis of such
description, 4' and that a person can be described sufficiently by using
means other than his name.14 There appears to be a practice among
the courts of Ohio to issue search warrants naming "John Doe" as the
"cperson to be seized."' 43 This practice was questioned in State v.
Young,14 4 where Emerson Young and others had been seen going in
and out of a building where a "numbers ticket" operation was sus-
pected of being located. When the police obtained the warrant, John
Doe, rather than Emerson Young, was named as the person to be
seized. Upon entering the house, police found Young talking on the
telephone, and arrested him and searched his person. The court, in a
rather confusing opinion, held both the arrest and search to be proper
because, "Here there was a warrant against one 'John Doe' who, in
this instance, happened to be Emerson Young.' 45 There seems to be
little to indicate that the legislature meant this section to serve as a
provision for the issuance of warrants to arrest, as well as to search,
since arrests are governed by a different section of the code. However,
assuming the arrest was reasonable and made upon probable cause,
such a reading of the statute probably will not create constitutional
problems.
A recent common pleas decision 14 indicates an unreasonable pre-
occupation with the technicalities of the procedural search warrant
statutes. The affidavit stated all the facts upon which the officers based
their belief that probable cause existed, and the warrant was issued.
However the order of execution on the warrant was not signed by the
issuing judge. The court held that the warrant was void for failure to
comply with the applicable statute, 147 providing for the form of a
search warrant. The court reasoned that search warrants are creatures
of statute and accordingly the form and contents must be strictly
construed. This is, of course, not a constitutionally required formality.
The judge decided that probable cause existed upon facts placed before
140 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.24 (Page Supp. 1965).
141 Cincinnati v. Bush, 24 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 81 (Munic. Ct. Cincinnati 1922).
142 Kovacs v. State, 24 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 1 (C.P. 1922).
143 See, e.g., Akron v. Williams, supra note 133; State v. Young, 91 Ohio L. Abs. 21,
185 N.E.2d 33 (1962), appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 329 (1963); Kovacs v. State, supra
note 142.
144 Supra note 143.
145 State v. Young, supra note 143, at 25, 185 NYE.2d at 36.
146 State v. Vuin, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 185 N.E.2d 506 (C.P. 1962).
147 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.25 (Page Supp. 1965).
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him by affidavits sufficient under both the statute and the constitution.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that such a decision was made necessary
by prior case law. The Ohio Supreme Court had said, in an earlier
case, that an error in the form of a search warrant which was "purely
technical" would not invalidate an otherwise valid warrant. 4 The
procedure of the search warrant statutes should be followed by the
courts and the police in order to carry out the policy of the statutes.
But there is not enough danger of harm resulting from a failure to
follow this particular procedure to warrant the exclusion of valid evi-
dence which is relevant to the issues of the case. On the other hand,
the requirement of setting forth in the affidavit all the facts, so that the
magistrate may determine probable cause, is a very important provi-
sion which the courts will enforce strictly.
B. Search Incident to Arrest
The general rule, subject to some exceptions, is that a search may
not be made without a warrant. One exception is that a search incident
to a lawful arrest will, under certain circumstances, be sustained. 4 The
basic roots of this doctrine lie in necessity, its purposes being to protect
the arresting officer and to deprive the arrested prisoner of a potential
means of escape through the use of weapons, and to avoid destruction
of evidence by the arrested person.8 0 The fact that evidence of an
additional crime is discovered during the search does not make it
illegal, nor does it prevent prosecution for such additional offense.'
From the purposes, it necessarily follows that officers may seize
not only things physically on the person arrested, but those within his
immediate control.I 2 The area within defendant's control has been
construed by the Supreme Court of the United States to include de-
148 State v. Sabo, 10S Ohio St. 200, 140 N.E. 499 (1923). The phrase in the warrant,
"in the nighttime" was not stricken from the warrant, thus appearing to give the officers
the authority to search at night. However, the words were deleted in the affidavit, and
the search was in fact made in the daytime. See also Frederich v. State, 1 Ohio L. Abs. 553
(Ct. App. 1923), where a variance in the affidavit of 51st to 50th Street where the liquor
was actually found was not of sufficient importance to overturn a conviction.
149 E.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914); Dixon v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 20, 201 N.E.2d 529 (1964); Saulsbury
v. Green, 175 Ohio St. 433, 195 N.E.2d 787, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 912 (1964) ; State v.
Beck, 175 Ohio St. 73, 191 N.E2d 825 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 379 U.S. 89
(1964); Williams v. Eckle, 173 Ohio St. 410, 183 N.E.2d 365 (1962).
160 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (Mr. justice Frankfurter dis-
senting).
151 Williams v. Eckle, supra note 149; State v. Hatfield, 1 Ohio App. 2d 346, 204
N.E.2d 574 (1965).
152 Harris v. United States, 331 US. 145 (1947); Williams v. Eckle, supra note 149.
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fendant's entire house. 53 These cases, however, appear to go beyond
the rule of necessity. Another example of this is United States v.
Rabinowitz,"54 where police officers arrested defendant in his office,
and over his objection, searched the desk, safe, and file cabinets for
about an hour and a half, finding and seizing evidence which was later
used against him at trial. The Court held that even if the officers had
time to procure a search warrant, they were not bound to do so. The
arrest was valid, and the search was confined to the area within the
control of the defendant; thus the evidence was admissible. In his
dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter contended that the purposes of the
rule did not require this result. There was no danger that the evidence
would be destroyed or that the safety of the officers was in jeopardy.
Therefore, there was no reason to make an exception to the require-
ment that an independent magistrate determine the existence of prob-
able cause.' 5
Several recent cases indicate a weakening of the Rabinowitz doc-
trine in favor of encouraging officers to obtain search warrants. In
Aguilar v. Texas,'56 Mr. Justice Goldberg, in holding an affidavit for
a search warrant to be insufficient, said that where a search is based
on the magistrate's determination of probable cause, rather than that
of the officer, the reviewing court will accept evidence of a less judi-
dally competent or persuasive character to sustain such search.'5 T Also
in a similar case, the same Justice noted that "doubtful or marginal
cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be
accorded to warrants."'5 s
Further limiting the Rabinowitz doctrine is the recent Supreme
Court case of Preston v. United States.'59 After the defendant had
been arrested and booked at the police station, the officers returned to
the automobile in which he had been seated at the time of the arrest.
There they found two loaded revolvers in the glove compartment. The
Court held that the search was too remote in time and place to the
arrest to be incident thereto. At this point there was no danger that any
153 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Harris v. United States, supra note 152.
But see Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957), where the court held a search of
the defendant's entire cabin to be unreasonable. However, an additional factor in this case
was that many items had been taken, indicating a general ransack with no particular
item being the object of the search.
154 Supra note 150.
155 Supra note 154 (dissenting opinion).
156 Supra note 134.
357 Id. at 111.
158 United States v. Ventresca, supra note 136, at 109.
159 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
[Vol. 27
COMMENT
of the men arrested could have used any of the weapons in the car or
have destroyed any of the evidence.
Preston has been followed in Ohio under similar facts on several
occasions.6 0 The most interesting of these cases is State v. Waldbillig,'61
where defendant and four other occupants of a car were arrested and
searched. At that time, a machete knife on the floor of the back seat
was clearly visible from outside the vehicle, and was seized by the
arresting officer. Thereafter, defendant and his companions, as well as
the automobile, were taken to the police station. After reaching the
station, the car was searched with the result that several other incrimi-
nating items were found, including some "homemade knuckles." De-
fendant's motion to suppress as evidence all the items found in the car
was overruled, and he was convicted of concealing dangerous weapons.
The Ohio Supreme Court determined that the evidence discovered
during the search at the police station was inadmissible on the au-
thority of Preston. However, the machete knife was not found as a
result of an illegal search since it was clearly visible at the time of the
arrest, and was seized at that time. This is clearly within the purposes
of the search incident to arrest exception. Where the knife was visible
on the back seat of the automobile, the officers were justified in seizing
it for their own safety. However, after the defendant had been
arrested and taken into custody, there was no justifiable reason for
searching the automobile without first securing a search warrant.
C. Search Without a Warrant
Absent a valid arrest, a search without a warrant is usually held
to be illegal even if made upon probable cause. An exception to this
generalization is that where the search is made of a vehicle which has
been stopped, it may under certain circumstances be upheld. This
exception was first applied to cases decided under the National Pro-
hibition Act and revenue statutes, where it was held that searches of
automobiles prior to arrest were justified when the officers had prob-
able cause to believe that intoxicating liquor was being transported
therein. 2 The justification was that goods in the course of transporta-
tion could be concealed in a movable vessel where they were out of the
reach of a warrant.
160 State v. Davis, 1 Ohio St. 2d 28, 203 N.E.2d 357 (1964); State v. Waldbillig, 1
Ohio St. 2d 50, 203 N.E.2d 361 (1964); State v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241
(1964).
161 Supra note 160.
162 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ; Husty v. United States, 282 U.S.
694 (1931) ; Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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The Ohio Supreme Court reached this result in Hauck v. State.16
A town marshall had information that defendant was engaged in boot-
legging. One evening he observed defendant's automobile parked on the
street, and without a search warrant examined the car finding whiskey
concealed in violation of the law. The court held that the marshall
acted in good faith and on information which he believed to be true,
thus he could lawfully search the automobile without first obtaining a
warrant. While the Hauck case was decided under a statute authorizing
officers who discover persons unlawfully transporting intoxicating
liquor in a vehicle to seize the liquor and arrest the person in charge
thereof, other cases have allowed warrantless searches of an auto-
mobile where no such provision exists, and the exception now seems to
be firmly established.0 4
One troublesome aspect of the Ohio cases involving searches of
automobiles without a warrant is the language in Hauck, which is often
cited, stating that a search under circumstances in which the police
officers acted "in good faith and upon such information as induces the
honest belief that the person in charge of the automobile is in the act
of violating the law," is valid. 6 5 If this language means that mere sus-
picion plus the good faith of the officer is sufficient to justify an arrest
or search, it is clearly incorrect by constitutional standards which
require probable cause to be found. However, it is clear that the Ohio
cases do not follow this language, and at least one recent case has
specifically rejected it as no longer the law. 66
Although the courts will sustain a search without a warrant of
an automobile, they usually will not, except in an emergency, sustain
such a search of a private dwelling. The dominant theme of the cases
involving a search of a home is the protection of the right of privacy.
Thus the Ohio courts have held that a search made pursuant to an
invalid warrant may not be upheld even though there may have been
probable cause to believe the items were concealed in the house.'67
In State v. Keeling, 6' police entered the stairway of the apart-
163 106 Ohio St. 195, 140 N.E. 112 (1922).
164 Porello v. State, 121 Ohio St. 280, 168 N.E. 135 (1929); State v. Coleman, 91
Ohio L. Abs. 191, 186 N.E.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1962), appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 574
(1963); South Euclid v. Palidino, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 280, 193 N.E.2d 560 (Munic. Ct. South
Euclid 1963); State v. Rogers, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796 (C.P. 1963).
165 Hauck v. State, supra note 163, syllabus 2; cited in Porello v. State, supra note
164, and 48 Ohio Jur. 2d Search and Seizure § 10 (1961).
166 State v. Rogers, supra note 164.
167 Nicholas v. Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 474, 182 N.E. 26 (1932); State v. Vuin, 89
Ohio L. Abs. 193, 185 N.E.2d 506 (C.P. 1962).
168 182 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
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ment building where defendant resided on a suspicion that a numbers
game was being conducted in the building. Inside the building the
police heard the sound of an adding machine emanating from de-
fendant's apartment, and forceably entered without a warrant. The
state sought to justify the entry, claiming that the police had reason-
able grounds to believe a crime was being committed and all evidence
of crime would be destroyed unless the police moved quickly. The
court observed that there was ample time for the police to obtain a
search warrant from one of the several judges whose offices were only
eight to ten minutes away from the scene. It is interesting to compare
this case to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Rabinowitz,3 discussed above, where it was held that in a search inci-
dent to an arrest, the practicability of obtaining a search warrant is
not a factor in determining reasonableness. Keeling indicates an in-
creased awareness on the part of the courts in the last few years of the
desirability of requiring a warrant to be issued whenever practicable.
The federal courts are similarly reluctant to uphold a search
without a warrant which is not incident to, but the cause of, an
arrest.170 An example is the Supreme Court case of Jones v. United
States,171 where the officers proceeded to defendant's house, armed with
a daytime search warrant, but did not exercise it immediately. After
dark a truck drove into the yard in view of the agents and became
stuck. The agents arrested the occupants of the truck and seized 413
gallons of non-taxpaid whiskey. Defendant was arrested when he
returned about an hour after a search of his house had been completed.
It was conceded that the daytime search warrant had expired, but the
motion to suppress was denied on the theory that there was probable
cause for the search of the dwelling. On appeal, it was contended that
the officers had authority to enter the house to make an arrest, and
while they were searching for the suspect, they could seize all contra-
band in plain sight. However, the Supreme Court felt that the real
purpose of entering the home was to make a search and not to arrest,
and that such search could not be made without a valid warrant. 2
Where there is probable cause for both an arrest and a search,
many courts will sustain the search even if it technically precedes the
169 Supra note 150, at 64.
170 See Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952); Walker v. United
States, 125 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1942); United States v. Novero, 58 F. Supp. 275 (D.C. Mo.
1944).
171 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
172 Similar rulings have been made by the Court on other occasions. Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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arrest. In a recent federal case, 7-3 petitioner in a habeas corpus case
admitted while being questioned in her home that she had burned her
baby and placed it in the furnace. The police immediately, without
announcing her arrest, proceeded to the basement and discovered the
body. The court held that the search without a warrant was justified,
noting that the fact that the search precedes the formal arrest is im-
material when the arrest and search are nearly simultaneous. It should
be noted that even under these circumstances, the police could have
arrested the woman without a warrant, as permitted by the law of
arrest, 174 and come back later with a warrant to search for the body.
However, during the extra time it would have taken to secure a war-
rant, it is possible that the body could have been further destroyed
in the furnace.
This case points up several problems in the area of warrantless
searches. One can question the wisdom of the distinction made between
searches of a dwelling made without a warrant, and cases involving
warrantless searches of automobiles, since in any case the search must
be reasonable. Furthermore, an arrest may constitutionally be made
without a warrant, and a reasonable search made incident thereto is
valid even though the search is made of a dwelling.' However there
is a greater need for privacy in a home, which the law should protect.
It may therefore be a wise policy to require a warrant to enter a home
where the only purpose is to search, and there is no immediate danger
of destruction of the evidence. But where there is probable cause to
arrest, as well as to search, i.e., where there is a reasonable belief that
a crime has been committed, there may be a greater danger that the
evidence will be lost or used to commit a crime. This may justify a
search and arrest without a warrant.
D. Arrests Pursuant to Warrant
Since searches made incident to a lawful arrest are valid under
Ohio and federal law, the question of the legality of arrests is frequently
litigated. Arrests, with or without a warrant, may be legal. Arrests
pursuant to a warrant are governed by sections 2935.09 and 2935.10
of the criminal code. Section 2935.09 requires a peace officer or a
private citizen having knowledge of the facts to file with the judge or
clerk of court of record, or with a magistrate an affidavit charging the
offense committed.7 6 No warrant may issue without the filing of such
173 Holt v. Simpson, 340 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1965).
174 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
175 Ibid.
176 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.09 (Page Supp. 1965).
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affidavit.177 Upon the filing of the affidavit charging the commission of
a felony, the judge, clerk, or magistrate is required by 2935.10 to issue
a warrant for the arrest of the person charged (unless he has reason to
believe that it was not filed in good faith or the claim is not merito-
rious). 17 The duty to issue the warrant is mandatory and minis-
terial; 179 thus even a clerk can issue such a warrantL' °
The above described arrest procedure is clearly not within the
federal constitutional standard. First, the literal phrasing of the
statute does not seem to import a probable cause requirement, and if it
does not, it is unconstitutional.' 8l There have been no cases found
which decide this precise question, but it would appear that no court
would read this part of the statute literally. There must be reasonable
cause to believe the person arrested without a warrant is guilty of the
offense; therefore, there is no reason why the same standard would not
be read to apply to arrests with a warrant.
A more serious objection to the Ohio statute is that a judge or
magistrate need not decide probable cause before issuing the warrant.
The affidavit is required only to state the offense committed and need
not set out facts upon which probable cause is based. This is repugnant
to the fourth amendment. In Giordenello v. United States, 8 2 the
United States Supreme Court held the inference that probable cause
exists must be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
the officers engaged in the apprehension of suspects. The purpose of
the affidavit is to enable the magistrate to determine if the warrant
should issue, hence it must contain facts constituting probable cause.
It has been argued that Giordenello was based entirely upon rules
3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and not upon
constitutional grounds. 3 However, the more recent decision in Aguilar
v. Texas'84 indicates the rule is based upon the fourth amendment.
That case held a warrant issued pursuant to Texas law was insufficient
where the affidavit gave a mere conclusion as to probable cause, rather
than facts upon which the judge could base a decision about the pro-
177 Kaptur v. Kaptur, 50 Ohio App. 91, 197 N.E. 496 (1934).
178 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.10 (Page Supp. 1965).
170 Nicholas v. Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 474, 182 N.. 26 (1932); see State ex rel.
Goodman v. Redding, 87 Ohio St. 388, 101 N.E. 275 (1913), where it was held that the
issuance of an arrest warrant may be compelled by mandamus.
180 State ex rel. Focke v. Price, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 214, 137 NE.2d 163 (CL App. 1955);
Rornack v. State, 39 Ohio App. 203, 177 N.E. 244 (1931); Molitor v. State, 6 Ohio
C.C.R. 263 (Ct. App. 1892).
181 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
182 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
183 Note, 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 395 (1959).
184 Supra note 181.
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priety of the search. Concededly Aguilar involved a search warrant
rather than an arrest warrant, but the Court quoted at length from
Giordenello and referred to the search and arrest warrants inter-
changeably.185
In light of these recent decisions, the Ohio procedure on arrest
warrants should be revised to require the affidavit to state facts upon
which a judge or magistrate can base probable cause similar to present
procedure on the issuance of search warrants. Furthermore, since the
issuance of an arrest warrant will constitute a judicial act, and the
duties of a clerk are considered ministerial, the act should be amended
to provide that only a judge or magistrate may issue the warrant.
E. Arrest Without a Warrant
Although a search without a warrant is not generally permissible,
a different rule is applied to arrests. The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that, assuming probable cause exists for an arrest, it
makes no difference whether the officer acted with or without a war-
rant."8 6 Although one might wonder what factors justify an invasion
of privacy in arrest cases but do not justify it for searches, this prin-
ciple is now firmly established lS
In Ohio, by statute, any person may make an arrest "when a
felony has been committed, or there is reasonable ground to believe
that a felony has been committed .. .. ,I" Thereafter, the person
arrested must be taken before a court or magistrate having jurisdiction
over the arrest, and the arresting person shall make an affidavit stating
the offense for which the arrest was made."8 9 Such affidavit must be
filed either with the court or magistrate, or with the prosecuting at-
torney who must file a complaint based upon it.9 ' It has been held
that the failure of the police to comply with the section requiring
prompt presentation before a judge does not invalidate a subsequent
conviction made on proper and sufficient evidence.' 9' Also, the ques-
tion of the point in time at which the affidavit was filed has been held
not to affect the validity of the arrest. 92 Therefore it would appear that
evidence seized during a search which is incident to an otherwise lawful
185 For the effect of Aguilar on Texas law, see McClung, "Recent Developments in
Search and Seizure," 28 Texas B. 3. 93 (1965).
186 Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961).
187 See Comment, 25 Ohio St. LJ. 538, 549 (1965).
188 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.04 (Page 1954).
189 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.06 (Page Supp. 1965).
190 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.06 (Page Supp. 1965).
19' Cato v. Alvis, 288 F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1961).
192 Columbus v. Glen, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 449, 102 N.E.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1950).
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arrest would be admissible despite the failure of the arresting officer
to file a prompt affidavit.
Arrests for misdemeanors are more restricted than for felonies.
Only an officer of the law can arrest for a misdemeanor,'93 and then
only if the person arrested is "found violating a law of this state or
an ordinance of a municipal corporation. . . ."I The cases have gen-
erally held that in order for the arrest to be valid, the misdemeanor
must be committed within the presence of the arresting officer,' 95 and
that the arrest must take place shortly thereafter. 96 The application
of this standard creates problems in certain types of cases. For
example, in the concealed possession cases, the offense may occur in
the officer's presence but not within his perception. In State v. Smith,197
it was decided that an arrest made under such circumstances was
illegal. This result is correct by fourth amendment standards, since
the arrest was probably made without probable cause.
A problem also occurs where the officer believes an offense is
being committed in his presence, when in fact it is not. There is
language in several early Ohio cases which seems to indicate that if the
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the offense is being com-
mitted in his presence, the arrest is valid. 9" Therefore, evidence seized
incident to such an arrest would be admissible in another suit against
the defendant. However, not all cases would agree with such a rule. In
Columbus v. Holmes,'99 defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct
in attempting to resist a prior arrest. The facts were that she was in
possession of the keys and certificate of title naming H. H. Huff as
owner of a car which she claimed had been given to her by Mr. Huff.
Mr. Huff called the police asking them to seize the certificate and keys
from Mrs. Holmes. The court held that Mrs. Holmes had in fact com-
mitted no misdemeanor, and that the action of the officers in ordering
her to return the property was improper; therefore, she was justified
193 Fitscher v. Rollman and Sons Co., 31 Ohio App. 340, 167 N.E. 469 (1929);
Lester v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 61 Ohio L. Abs. 360 (C.P. 1951), rev'd on other
grounds, 94 Ohio App. 313, 114 N.E.2d 529 (1952).
104 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.03 (Page 1954).
195 State v. Lewis, 50 Ohio St. 179, 33 N.E. 405 (1893); Cincinnati v. O'Neil, 3 Ohio
App. 2d 139, 209 N.E.2d 635 (1965); Huth v. Woodard, 108 Ohio App. 135, 161 N.E.2d
230 (1958) ; Columbus v. Glen, supra note 192; Clark v. DeWalt, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 114
N.E.2d 126 (C.P. 1953).
196 State v. Marshall, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 568, 105 N.E.2d 891 (Munic. Ct. Piqua 1952).
397 19 Ohio Op. 454 (C-P. 1940).
198 Ballard v. State, 43 Ohio St. 340, 345, 1 N.E. 76, 79 (1885); Ryan v. Conover,
59 Ohio App. 361, 364, 18 N.E.2d 277, 279 (1937); Bock v. Cincinnati, 43 Ohio App. 257,
261, 183 N.E. 119, 121, appeal dsrmissed, 124 Ohio St. 667, 181 N.E. 888 (1931).
199 107 Ohio App. 391, 152 N.E.2d 301 (1958).
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in resisting arrest. The opinion states that an arrest for a misdemeanor
is invalid if the offense was not actually committed, even though the
arresting officer may have had a good faith and honest belief that there
was a violation. Thus, it is not clear whether, in Ohio, the misdemeanor
must actually have been committed before an arrest without a warrant
can be made. Furthermore, the decisions of other jurisdictions are
of little help, since they are generally in disagreement. 00
What constitutes an arrest is another source of confusion and
disagreement. Some have argued that an arrest takes place when there
is a stopping, restraining, or interfering with the freedom of movement
of an individual.21 But the term has been more commonly used to
signify a more formal detention involving an actual taking into
custody.202 Regardless of the legal definition of arrest, police will
commonly stop an individual without probable cause when the indi-
vidual seems, because of his conduct or appearance, to be suspicious 0 3
In addition, after stopping the suspect, the police often "frisk" him,
i.e., pat his outer clothing in order to detect concealed weapons. 4
It should be noted that this practice was recently upheld by an
Ohio court of appeals. 0 5 The court reasoned that the police have
authority to stop and question a suspicious person without probable
200 Cases holding that the offense must actually have been committed: Edgin v.
Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 276 S.W.2d 591 (1925); Price v. Tehan, 84 Conn. 164, 79 Atl. 68
(1911); Muniz v. Mehlman, 327 Mass. 353, 99 N.E.2d 37 (1951). Cases holding that the
offense need not have been committed if the officer had reasonable grounds to believe
there was a violation in his presence: Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876,
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 840 (1952); Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478, 152 P.2d 886 (1944).
201 United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mass. 1960); United States v.
Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1959). In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959),
the prosecution conceded that the arrest of defendant took place when the federal agents
stopped the car. The Court accepted this view for the purpose of the case.
202 United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 US. 823
(1962); United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960); People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645,
290 P.2d 531 (1955); People v. Entrialgo, 19 App. Div. 2d 509, 245 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1963).
See Bator and Vorenberg, "Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel:
Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions," 66 Colum. L. Rev. 61, 67 (1966).
The distinction between arrest and detention has been pointed out by several authorities:
Leagre, "The Fourth Amendment and the Lav of Arrest," 54 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 393,
406 (1963) ; Warner, "The Uniform Arrest Act," 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 318-19 (1942).
203 LaFave, "Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current
Practices," 1962 Wash. U.L.Q. 331, 335-38; Remington, "The Law Relating to 'On the
Street' Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Privileges in
General," 51 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 386, 389 (1960); Note, 'Thiladelphia Police Practice
and the Law of Arrest," 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1182, 1204-05 (1952).
204 LaFave, supra note 203, at 335-38; Remington, supra note 203, at 391.
205 State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
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cause because such a stopping does not constitute an arrest. Moreover,
the police could frisk, incident to such a stopping, to insure their own
safety against dangerous weapons. The scope of the frisk was limited,
however, in that it could not include a search for contraband or evi-
dential material. Finally, the court held that after a weapon is found,
it may be used by the officers to furnish probable cause for a subse-
quent formal arrest. This result is in line with the majority of cases
which have considered the problem. °6
VI. PROCEDURE TO OBJECT TO USE OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE
A. Motion to Suppress
In the federal courts, the use of illegally seized evidence can be
attacked through a motion to suppress under rule 41 (e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is no such statutory procedure in
Ohio, but many reported cases can be found where the issue was raised
by a motion made before trial,2 °7 or a motion seeking the return of the
206 The situation described has been the subject of much litigation, legislation and
comment. Some of the leading cases are as follows: People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290
P.2d 531 (1955); People v. Jones, 176 Cal. App. 2d 265, 1 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959); People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 255 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 936 (1965); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d
458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965). People v. Rivera, supra involved facts
strikingly similar to the Ohio case. Three New York City detectives observed two men
walking to the front of a business establishment, looking inside, and generally acting
suspicious. The police stopped the men, patted their. clothing and discovered a loaded
weapon. The New York Court of Appeals held that despite the lack of probable cause,
police may nevertheless stop and frisk suspicious persons.
Also, several statutes have been enacted, modeled more or less after the Uniform
Arrest Act, which allow the police to stop a suspicious person on less than probable cause.
Among them are: Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1901-12 (1953); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 41,
§ 98 (1961); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 594:1-25 (1955); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180(a)
(Supp. 1965); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 12-7-1 to -13 (1956). The New York statute was
upheld in People v. Pugach, supra.
For a complete discussion of the principles involved in stop and frisk statutes, see
Leagre, supra note 202, at 406-19; Remington, supra note 203; Comment, "Police Power
to Stop, Frisk and Question Suspicious Persons," 65 Colum. L. Rev. 848 (1965).
207 State v. Beck, 175 Ohio St. 73, 191 N.E.2d 825 (1963), rev'd on other grounds,
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); State v. Thompson, 1 Ohio App. 2d 533, 206 N.E.2d 5
(1965); State v. Hatfield, 1 Ohio App. 2d 346, 204 N.E.2d 699 (1965); State v. Bartlett,
119 Ohio App. 483, 200 N.E.2d 660 (1964); State v. Young, 93 Ohio L. Abs. 24, 193 N.E.2d
560, appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 329, 189 N.E.2d 151 (1964); State v. Smith, 29 Ohio
Op. 2d 437, 202 N.E.2d 215 (C.P. 1964); South Euclid v. Pallidino, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 280,
193 N.E.2d 560 (Munic. Ct. South Euclid 1963); State v. Cooper, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 361,
196 N.E.2d 160 (Munic. Ct. Bellefontaine 1963); State v. Rogers, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198
N.E.2d 796 (C.P. 1963).
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property.208 Several early lower courts ruled that the issue of whether
evidence was obtained by an illegal search and seizure should be raised
in the trial court.20 9 Recently however, the supreme court in State v.
Davis21° ruled that the motion must be made before trial. The opinion
says that if the counsel knows about the unlawful search and seizure in
ample time to prepare and file a motion to suppress prior to the trial,
his failure to do so will amount to a waiver by the accused.2 n Thus,
the court also gave its sanction to the motion to suppress as the ap-
proved method of raising the issue as well as requiring that such
motion be made timely. The Davis rule is similar to rule 41(e) which
states: the motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless oppor-
tunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the
grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain
the motion at the trial or hearing. 12 The recent United States
Supreme Court case of Henry v. M1lississippi,213 could conceivably
cast some constitutional doubt on state procedural rules such as
the one espoused in Davis. Mississippi had a rule requiring con-
temporaneous objection to the introduction of illegal evidence. The
defendant did not make a timely objection to the introduction of
evidence seized during a search, but did raise the question of its
illegality in a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the
state's case. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the defendant's
conviction and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of the United
States stated the familiar rule that Supreme Court review of a state
case cannot be had where there is adequate state ground to support the
decision, even where federal questions are also decided.214 The Court
then said a state procedural rule cannot prevent the vindication of a
federally protected right, unless it serves a legitimate state interest.
The contemporaneous objection rule, it was said, serves a legitimate
state interest by apprising the trial judge of the objection, so that he is
given opportunity to conduct the trial without using the tainted evi-
dence. However this purpose "may have been substantially served" by
the motion for a directed verdict.21 The case was remanded to the
208 State v. Clauson, 118 Ohio App. 535, 196 N.E.2d 144 (1962).
209 Howe v. State, 39 Ohio App. 58, 177 N.E. 46 (1931): Manley v. State, 7 Ohio L.
Abs. 45 (Ct. App. 1928); Gilmore v. State, 15 Ohio App. 432, (1921); Hendershot v.
State, 14 Ohio App. 430 (1921).
210 1 Ohio St. 2d 28, 203 N.E.2d 357 (1964).
211 The court had previously stated this to be the rule in dictum in Nicholas v.
Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 474, 182 N.E. 26 (1932).
212 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e).
213 379 U.S. 443 (1964).
214 Id. at 446.
215 Id. at 448.
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state court with instructions to determine whether counsel deliberately
bypassed the opportunity to make a timely objection, in which case he
would be deemed to have waived his constitutional rights. It is argu-
able that another purpose of the remand was to allow the state court
to determine if the purposes of the rule were served by a motion for a
directed verdict. Even if the purposes were the same, the court could
still find that the defendant consciously waived the right to exclude the
evidence by not objecting at the time of its admission.
In any event, it seems reasonably clear that the Davis rule serves
a legitimate state interest in that if the objection is made before trial,
the court will not be required to interrupt the proceedings to determine
the issue of the legality of the search. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
of the United States has given its sanction to the rule by approving
the federal rule which is substantially similar.
B. Standing to Object
Early practice in Ohio, as well as in the federal courts, held that
a person who was not a "victim" of an illegal search could not object
to the admission of illegally seized evidence. The privilege was limited
to the laws of property; thus the person raising the question of an
illegal search and seizure had to claim ownership in the premises 216 or
the property seized.217 In Ohio, the supreme court rationalized that
upon a motion for the return of property, no principle of law allows
the courts to deliver to a person personal property which does not
belong to him." The problem arose in possession cases; in such cases,
to claim ownership of the property would in effect be to admit com-
mission of the offense charged.2 19 In Jones v. United States, 220 the
United States Supreme Court, for the first time, specifically approved
of the standing requirement, and in so doing greatly liberalized it to
alleviate some former problems. Defendant had been given the use of
an apartment by a friend but had slept there only occasionally. When
defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from a search of the
apartment, the government challenged his standing on the ground that
he did not allege either ownership in the seized articles or an interest
greater than that of an invitee or guest in the apartment searched. The
216 Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Hahn v. State, 38 Ohio
App. 461, 176 N.E. 164 (1930).
217 Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932); Rosansli v. State, 106 Ohio
St. 442, 140 N.E. 370 (1922); Hahn v. State, supra note 216.
218 Rosanski v. State, supra note 217, at 456, 140 N.E. at 374.
210 The problem was recognized and discussed by Judge Learned Hand in Connolly
v. Medalie, supra note 217, at 630.
220 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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Court rejected the earlier common law property distinctions to deter-
mine standing. Where evidence obtained in a search is being used
against the defendant, he may challenge its legality if he was "legiti-
mately on the premises" where the search occurred, and was in such
proximity to the article as to be able to exercise immediate control over
it.22' But where the defendant is not charged with a possessory offense,
and the search is not directed against him, there is no invasion of his
privacy, and he has no standing to object.222
Since Jones, the Ohio cases have retained the requirement of
standing,228 but it is unclear whether or not they are following the
more liberalized doctrine of the federal courts. In State v. Keeling,224
police searched the premises where one of the defendants resided. They
smashed open the door, discovering the six defendants and a clearing
house operation inside. The court said: "To establish such standing, an
accused must claim ownership or possession of the seized property or
a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched or a legiti-
mate presence on the premises."' 5 As to the defendant lessee, who
resided on the premises, the court determined that she had standing by
virtue of her residence, in spite of the fact that she was engaged in
illegal activity on the premises. This determination was correct under
the Jones rationale. But as to four other defendants, whom the court
said "were engaged in unlawful activities on the premises," it was
decided that there was no standing. In so holding the court purported
to apply Jones, but this result is patently incorrect by that standard.
Although the Jones Court said that the defendant must be "legiti-
mately on the premises," this language was meant to prevent a tres-
passer from having standing. Obviously, if the defendant must not be
carrying on illegal activities upon the premises in order to have stand-
ing, there is no basis for the court's distinction between the lessee and
the persons on the premises with the lessee's permission, since one was
engaged in illegal activity as much as the other. Furthermore, the
facts of Jones offer no support to the judge's distinction. There the
defendant did not reside at the apartment but merely had permission
221 Id. at 267.
222 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963); United States v. Granello,
243 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
223 State v. Coleman, 91 Ohio L. Abs. 191, 186 N.E.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1962), appeal
dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 574, 191 N.E.2d 58 (1963); State v. Liosi, 91 Ohio L. Abs. 161,
185 NY.E2d 790 (Ct. App. 1962), appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 552, 190 N.E.2d 689
(1963); State v. Rogers, supra note 207; State v. Keeling, 182 N.E.2d 60 (C.P. 1962).
224 Supra note 223.
225 Supra note 222, at 67.
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to use it. He testified that he slept in the apartment "maybe a night."
The Court assumed throughout the argument that his "interest in the
apartment was no greater than that of an 'invitee or guest.' )226 In
addition, like the defendants in Keeling, the defendant was engaged
in an illegal activity upon the premises, viz., possession of narcotics.
Finally, assuming for the moment that the Ohio courts are not bound
to follow Jones, the distinction made in Keeling is unreasonable. The
right to question the use of evidence obtained in a search and seizure
should not depend on whether the defendant was committing a crime
at the time of the seizure. The effect of such a rule would be to com-
pletely undermine the exclusionary rule itself.
In State v. Rogers,227 a search was made of a car in which de-
fendant was an occupant, and a weapon was found which led to a
criminal action for possession of a concealed weapon. The court, citing
Jones, held that defendant had standing to object. This is a correct
application of Jones. In both cases, the defendant was being prosecuted
for possession of contraband. If the defendant is required to admit
such possession in order to object to the introduction of such evidence,
he would in effect be confessing to the crime for which he was being
tried. Furthermore, the defendant was legitimately in the searched
vehicle at the time of the search.
Although the court in Rogers applied the federal rule, it observed
that the Ohio Supreme Court could, if it wished, change the rule to
require an allegation of a possessory interest in the property before
standing would exist to challenge its introduction into evidence. The
question of whether the states must follow Jones is undecided. It is
reasonably clear that the states need not adopt any standing require-
ment. For example, California has not 2s But whether the states may
adopt a stricter standard than the federal courts is a different question.
The language of Jones is mostly in terms of who is a "person ag-
grieved" under rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
This indicates the possible absence of constitutional significance of the
case. On the other hand, there is discussion in the opinion to the
effect that the defendant must establish that he was himself the victim
of an invasion of privacy. Thus it is arguable that if a person is right-
fully on a premises which has been searched and property over which
he has some control has been seized, his constitutionally guaranteed
right to privacy has been invaded.
226 Jones v. United States, supra note 220, at 259.
227 Supra note 207.
228 People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
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C. Burden of Proof
In close cases, the question of who has the burden of proof with
respect to probable cause may be of some importance. Neither the
Supreme Court of the United States nor that of Ohio has specifically
decided this question, and the lower court decisions are in seemingly
hopeless conflict. One writer has attempted to resolve the conflicting
results among the federal cases by making a distinction between
arrests or searches made pursuant to a warrant, and those made with-
out a warrant.229 Where a warrant has been issued most lower federal
courts have placed the burden on the defendant to prove the search or
arrest to have been invalid. 3 This result would seem to follow from
the language of several Ohio courts saying that where a warrant has
been issued, there is a presumption of its regularity.23' However, in
warrantless arrests or searches, most of the federal courts have said
that the burden is on the government to show that the officer had
knowledge upon which to base probable cause,132 while a few hold
otherwise. 33 The recent Supreme Court case of Beck v. Ohio" may
lend some support to this position. The Court in discussing the neces-
sity for a disclosure of the names of informants seemed to assume that
the burden was on the prosecution to show probable cause.235
The Ohio cases concerning the burden of proof on a warrantless
search or arrest are indecisive. No supreme court cases have been
found which discuss the point directly.2 36 However the Court of Ap-
peals for Franklin County recently placed the burden upon the de-
fendant.237 The court said:
220 Comment, 25 Ohio St. L.J. 502, 527-29 (1964).
230 Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1962); Batten v. United
States, 188 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1951). In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), a
case involving a search pursuant to warrant, the Supreme Court indicated that the party
challenging the search should bear the burden of establishing its invalidity.
231 Rosanski v. State, supra note 217, at 446, 140 N.E. at 371; Howe v. State, supra
note 209, at 61, 177 N.E. at 47; Kovacs v. State, 24 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 1, 9 (C.P. 1921).
232 United States v. Rivera, 321 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1963); Plazola v. United States,
291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959).
233 Hardin v. United States, 324 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1963); Wilson v. United States,
218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955).
234 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
235 In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), a case involving a search
without a warrant, the court impliedly assumed that the government had the burden.
236 Williams v. Eckle, 173 Ohio St. 410, 183 N.E.2d 365 (1962), was a habeas corpus
case in which the court stated that the burden was upon the petitioner to show that he
was deprived of his constitutional rights, i.e., that the search made was not incident to a
lawful arrest. However, the fact that this was a habeas corpus case partially explains the
result, since the petitioner in such cases must show that he is entitled to the remedy.
237 State v. Ball, 1 Ohio App. 2d 297, 204 N.E.2d 557, appeal dismissed, 176 Ohio St.
481, 200 N.E.2d 325 (1964).
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Defendant in the case before us elected not to deny by his
own testimony, or other evidence, the case presented by the state,
and made no attempt by way of cross-examination, or otherwise, to
show that the police officers had no reasonable cause to believe that a
felony had been committed. Such burden rested squarely on the
defense. Any doubts as to the reasonableness of the information
upon which the police officers acted is resolved, therefore, in their
favor.238
Two other recent lower courts have discussed the problem briefly, one
assuming that the burden of proving the validity of the search is
on the defendant,2 39 while the other has language which would seem
to indicate the burden is on the state. 40
It should be noted that the distinction made above between war-
rantless searches and searches pursuant to warrants cannot be found
in any of the cases, but is merely a theory which rationalizes the
results of most of the cases. An argument for the theory is that where
the police have made the effort to obtain a warrant from a judge or
magistrate, there should be a presumption of regularity. This would
serve as an added inducement to officers to secure warrants whenever
possible. Another difference between the two situations is that where
there is no warrant the defendant may not know the facts upon which
the police based probable cause. Therefore it may be unfair to require
him to prove the lack of probable cause.
But there is some justification for placing the burden on the state
in all cases, whether or not a warrant was issued. This would require
the prosecution to call the arresting officers as its witnesses, thus
allowing defendant's counsel to cross-examine them concerning prob-
able cause. Also, in certain instances the affidavit for a search warrant
need not disclose the names of informers. 4' Under these circum-
stances, even where a warrant was issued, it would be extremely diffi-
cult for the defendant to prove a lack of probable cause.
D. Disclosure of the Identity of Informers
Several situations must be distinguished in dealing with the re-
quirement of disclosure of the identity of informers in the face of a
plea of privilege on the part of the state. Where the officers seek a
search warrant, they must by the statute file with the judge or magis-
trate an affidavit stating that the complainant believes and has good
238 Id. at 301, 204 N.E.2d at 560.
239 State v. Rogers, supra note 207.
240 State v. Thompson, 1 Ohio App. 2d 533, 539, 206 N.E.2d 5, 9 (1965). The court
said "the record fails to show evidence of a substantial credible or probative nature to
warrant the finding that the police officers had reasonable grounds or probable cause to
believe that the defendant had committed or was in the act of committing a felony....
241 For analysis of this problem, see text accompanying note 246, infra.
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cause to believe that certain items are concealed, and state the facts
upon which such belief is based. 242 These facts may consist of state-
ments made to the officers by informers. If so, the names may be
required to be disclosed. 2 43 The statute says that the judge may
demand further information before issuing the warrant. Therefore, a
logical solution would seem to be that if the police wish to keep the
identity of the informant anonymous, they may do so. The judge
could then require additional facts to be brought forth orally until he
feels that probable cause has been shown.244
Where the search was made without a warrant, and the defendant
challenges it by the use of a motion to suppress, the rule should be the
same. The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Beck 45 appeared to hold
that the identity of the informer need not be disclosed unless such dis-
closure would be helpful to the defendant in making a defense. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing, set forth the better
rule. If the state cannot show probable cause except by disclosing the
identity of the informants, it may deem it necessary to do so. 246 This
rule is completely consistent with the majority of the federal cases
which require the government to assume the burden of proof to show
the validity of a warrantless search.
Under certain circumstances, knowledge of the identity of an
informant may be necessary in order to insure the defendant the "fair
trial" to which he is entitled under the fourteenth amendment. This
consideration is entirely apart from the issue of probable cause. An
example of this is the case of Roviaro v. United States.2 47 There, fed-
eral narcotics agents were notified by an informer that he intended to
purchase narcotics from the defendant at a given time. They met the
informer, and one of the agents secreted himself in the trunk of the
informer's auto. The agent heard part of the conversation between the
defendant and the informer and observed the defendant throw a
package into the car. The lower court did not require the government
to disclose the identity of the informer, nor would it permit the de-
fendant to question witnesses about the informant's identity. The
Supreme Court first addressed itself to the disclosure requirement as it
242 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.23 (Page Supp. 1965).
243 State v. Watson, 117 Ohio App. 333, 192 N.E.2d 253 (1962). See Akron v. Williams
175 Ohio St. 186, 192 N.E.2d 63 (1963), where an affidavit which stated that the affiant
had "personal knowledge or knowledge from a reliable source" was held insufficent.
244 Such a procedure was suggested in State v. Bartlett, 119 Ohio App. 483, 200
N.E.2d 660 (1964).
245 175 Ohio St. 73, 191 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
246 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
247 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
[Vol. 27
COMMENT
relates to probable cause; it said that the government must disclose the
identity of the informant, "unless there was sufficient evidence apart
from his confidential communication." '248 This is in essence the same
test as the Court later gave in Beck.
The Court then proceeded to the question of fair trial. Here the
emphasis switched to the fact that the informant was present at the
scene of the crime. The informant was the only material witness, and
if defendant could not be apprised of who was present when the alleged
crime took place, he would be deprived of the opportunity to examine
him. Impeachment at trial is thus made difficult or impossible.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Beck indicates a
confusion of the distinctions made above. The court, though consider-
ing the issue of probable cause, stated in its second syllabus that the
identity of an informer need not be disclosed if such disclosure "would
not be helpful and beneficial to the accused in making a defense to a
criminal charge lodged against him." '249 This is in reality the test for
determining the necessity of disclosure for the purposes of a "fair
trial," and not probable cause. Furthermore, the court attempted to
distinguish Roviaro by saying that here the informer took no part in
"trapping and apprehending the defendant."2 ' This factor is not rele-
vant for determining whether or not the identity should be disclosed
for purposes of probable cause, but is relevant as a factor tending to
show that the defendant would be denied a fair trial if there was no
opportunity to examine him on the witness stand.
CONCLUSION
Until Mapp v. Ohio, there were comparatively few Ohio cases
involving search and seizure. In the many cases decided since then, the
Ohio courts have been, for the most part, successful in applying the
federal standards of probable cause and reasonableness. The Ohio
cases on consent to search are conflicting in result; but the better
reasoned cases appear to follow the federal standard which requires
that the consent be given freely and intelligently.
Search and arrest warrants are governed in Ohio by statute. The
statutory arrest procedure does not require a judge or magistrate to
decide probable cause, as in demanded by the fourth amendment.
Hence, the Ohio procedure should be revised to conform to the con-
stitutional standards.
Ohio lawyers should be careful to raise all issues concerning illegal
248 Id. at 61.
249 Supra note 245, syllabus 2.
250 Supra note 245, at 277, 191 N.E.2d at 828.
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searches by a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence. The rules
regarding standing to object and burden of proof to establish prob-
able cause are not well defined in Ohio. The federal cases have been
given considerable weight. In areas where there are no Ohio cases, it
is likely that the courts will look in the future to the federal law.
Lawrence R. Elleman
